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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are many economic contexts -such as ﬁnancial markets daily routine, or the choice
of ﬁrms on technological adoptions under uncertain market conditions- in which informa-
tion is obtained privately and transmitted sequentially. Economists are naturally inter-
ested in the eﬀects of this sequentiality on (equilibrium) behavior, especially in the extent
with which sequentiality may impede the attainment of an eﬃcient outcome in which all
information is correctly embodied in equilibrium. Theorists, most notably Banerjee [5]
and Bickchandani et al. [6], have shown that sequentiality of information transmission
may yield ineﬃciency, as players undervalue their private information, thus yielding what
have been labeled as informational cascades. Experimentalists, beginning with Anderson
and Holt [3] and Allsop and Hey [1], have conﬁrmed empirically that such information
cascades do indeed occur in the lab.
The original theoretical literature we just mentioned posits a strategic environment
in which players receive a stochastic private signal about the “true” state of nature.
Subsequently, in a ﬁxed sequence exogenously given, they have to guess the true state
of nature, conditional on their private information and the observation of the guesses of
all preceding players. In this guessing game, players do not compete with each other,
since they are all rewarded with a ﬁxed prize in case of a correct guess. In this respect,
the literature has always treated the above situation as the ideal setting to analyze
information transmission abstracting from strategic considerations (which are, instead,
prominent, in sequential environments of a diﬀerent nature, such as signaling games).
Along these lines, Feri et al. [13] design an experiment based on the classic parlor
game known as the Chinos’ Game. In this game, players start by hiding in their hands
a certain number of marbles. Then, in some pre-speciﬁed order, each player has to guess
the total number of marbles in the hands of every player. When doing so, a player is
informed of her own number and the guesses produced by all others who preceded her.
Figure 1 reports a 2-player version of the Chinos Game, when the maximum number
of marbles in the hands of each player is 1. While in the original game this number is
chosen by each player, Figure 1 (by analogy with the experimental protocol) simpliﬁes
matters, leaving this decision in the hands of Nature, where the (iid) probability of
holding a marble is commonly known to be p>1
2.
Fig. 1. The Chinos Game (2-player version)
2In the game of Figure 1, all players who guess correctly win a ﬁxed prize. Thus, the
game has clear analogies with the models of positional learning we just referred to.1 In
this respect, Feri et al.’s [13] ﬁnd systematic deviations from proﬁt maximizing behavior,
which they rationalize with a simple model of error cascades, by which the higher the
probability of a deviation from optimal behavior (i.e. an error) on behalf of ﬁrst movers,
the higher the probability of a mistake in late-movers’ behavior.
Figure 2 provides a robustness check of Feri et al.’s [13] conjecture using our own ex-
perimental evidence. Figure 2 tracks, for each player position and experimental matching
group, the evolution across rounds of the relative frequency of times in which subjects
choose their proﬁt maximizing guess, assuming that players’ beliefs (i.e., a system of
probabilities of a positive signal conditional on predecessors’ guesses) are obtained by
“counting” the number of time a given signal was associated with a given guess in the
past (details in the Appendix).
Fig. 2. Error cascades I: relative frequencies of best responses
It may be worthwhile to notice that, by maximizing their winning probability, play-
ers perfectly reveal their private signal to later movers (see (1) below). In this respect,
Figure 2 shows that player 1’s learning path seems to crucially aﬀect the likelihood of
the other group members to select their payoﬀ maximizing action. In other words, the
extent to which Player 1 delivers a “clean” message of her private information seems to
crucially aﬀect the likelihood of her successors to maximize proﬁts. In Feri et al.’s [13],
this behavioral anomaly is framed in the context of McKelvey and Palfrey’s [21] Quan-
tal Response Equilibrium (QRE henceforth). This approach postulates that a) players
behave optimally subject to an error (with full support) and b) the probability of play-
ing suboptimally is decreasing the payoﬀ loss. Again, their analysis still maintains that
players do not have strategic motives, in that they aim to maximize the probability of
winning the prize (and, by doing so, they should perfectly reveal -up to an error- their
private signal).
1See also [8], [9].
3Assume, instead, that players are also moved by relative comparisons. This is very
reasonable to assume in the context of positional learning, where ﬁrst-movers play with
a clear information handicap, and by playing “optimally” give later movers a better
chance to win. To see why, look at Figure 1 and consider the situation of Anna whose
highest expected payoﬀ -which is attained by adding 1 (given p>1
2) to her signal, see
(1) below- is equal to p. However, by doing so, she perfectly reveals her signal to Beppe,
giving him the chance to win the prize for sure. If Anna were moved by envy -due to her
disadvantageous position in the sequence- she may be willing to shade (at least, partially)
her signal, with the aim of reducing Beppe’s probability of winning, even if this implies
a reduction of her own winning probability, too.
The aim of this paper is to look at the Chinos Game -here to be interpreted as a
stereotypical example of positional learning environment- allowing for the possibility that
subjects (although not necessarily all of them) deviate from proﬁt maximizing behavior
moved by distributional concerns. In this respect, this paper sits squarely in the growing
experimental literature which shows that, in a wide variety of situations, people exhibit
social (i.e. interdependent) preferences.2 This novel theoretical spin in the analysis of
positional learning motivates an experimental design in which we modify the original
protocol by introducing an endogenous random shock which reduces the probability of
getting the prize in the event of a correct guess of only one player in the sequence (we
call her the Selected Player, SP), whose identity changes from one round to the next. By
this design, we are able to estimate more eﬃciently subjects’ distributional concerns (and
how these concerns aﬀect information decoding along the sequence). We also condition
our estimates on additional information on subjects’ demographics, risk attitudes and
cognitive reﬂection we collect by way of a questionnaire.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant
literature. Theory is what we develop next, by setting up a formal account of the experi-
mental environment (Section 3.1), together with the development of a simple theoretical
model (Section 3.2) in which we show that, when relative comparisons aﬀect players’
preferences, information shading may be justiﬁed as rational (equilibrium) response.
This theoretical conjecture is then brought to its empirical validation by way the
design of a speciﬁcm o d i ﬁcation of the Chinos Game, whose experimental conditions
are described in detail in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our experimental ﬁndings.
Here we see that subjects’ average behavior is better approximated (and best, for some
of our experimental group) by a structural model which encompasses -together with
noise, unavoidable in the analysis of any experimental environment- the existence of
distributional motives. We also see that subjects’ socio-demographics are capable of
explaining a signiﬁcant amount of between-subject heterogeneity. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
a) less risk averse and more cognitive responsive subjects show greater ability to pursue
their individual objectives in the game, while b) women exhibit more altruistic behavior
than men, in that are less inclined to deviate from full revelation to rational shading.
Section 6 concludes, followed by an Appendix containing a more detailed account of Feri
et al.’s [13] model of error cascades, additional statistical evidence, the experimental
instructions and the questionnaire.
2This experimental evidence is well summarized in the excellent surveys of Fehr-Schmidt [12] and
Sobel [22].
42L i t e r a t u r e s u r v e y
In this section we review two strands of literature we consider relevant to our project.
Section 2.1 reports some experimental evidence on signaling games. As we mention in
the introduction, once we introduce social preferences, we give players a rational motive
to lie about their signal while, in the standard treatment of positional learning, they have
not. The second strand refers to the role of incentive eﬀects in the lab. This is relevant to
our purpose, since our only modiﬁcation to the original Chinos game protocol is exactly
to introduce an exogenous shock by which the expected payoﬀ of one player in the group
is arbitrarily reduced. While the literature we survey is only focused in the analysis of
direct incentive eﬀects, we are also interested in indirect eﬀects, i.e. the loss of trust on
the other players’ behalf, of the SP’s message.
2.1 Deception in Signaling Games
The experimental literature on signaling games mainly deals with the so-called Sender-
Receiver Game-form, by which one player (the sender) sends a message about her type
(which she is the only one who knows), while the other player (the Receiver), once he has
received the message, has to choose an action. Players’ monetary payoﬀso n l yd e p e n d s
on the Sender’s type and the Receiver’s action. The main ﬁnding of this literature
is that deception (i.e. senders lying about their types) is often used but, contrary to
equilibrium prediction, it is often believed. This is how Sopher and Zapater [23] explain
this behavioral anomaly: “In a game with two types, even if the players know that type 1
will always send the message ‘I am type 1,’ they act as if they failed to understand that
any other message must come from type 2”( p .5 ) .
Forsythe et al. [15] frame the signaling game as a market for product quality. Sellers
know the quality of their good (their type); buyers know only the distribution of qualities.
In their cheap talk treatment, at no cost, sellers can announce a range of quality, which
(they claim) includes the quality of their good. Buyers then decide whether or not to
buy and at what price. Thus, in this treatment of the experiment, sellers can deceive
buyers about their good’s quality, and many do (186 fraudulent claims out of a total
660 claims). Equilibrium analysis predicts that buyers will not be deceived, but in the
experiment they are. In another antifraud condition, sellers are constrained to include
their product’s true quality in the quality range they quote to buyers. Here, deception
is ruled out, yet buyers still sometimes overpay for the good as “buyers are not always
suﬃciently skeptical of their [seller’s] statements”. In particular, the authors conclude
that “Buyers are frequently taken in by the seller’s overoptimistic statements and bid too
much for the asset”.3 Finally, Gneezy [17] interprets the evidence of Sender-Receiver
games by appealing to social preferences. He argues that subjects care not only about
how much they gain from lying, but also how much the other side loses. While subjects
are mostly sensitive to their gain when deciding to lie, this unselﬁsh motive diminishes
as the induced payoﬀ diﬀerence grows.
2.2 Incentive eﬀects in experiments
3See also Sopher and Zapater [23].
5Broadly speaking, we can say that economists generally assume that experimental sub-
jects work harder, more persistently, and more eﬀectively if they can earn more money
for better performance. By, contrast, psychologists generally believe that intrinsic mo-
tivation may produce focussed eﬀo r te v e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fﬁnancial rewards. Hence,
for economists higher payoﬀs lead to higher performance, while for psychologists what
matters is intrinsic motivation . There is a vast literature on this topic and we report
here a subset of this literature that we consider most relevant to this paper. Camerer
and Hogarth [7] review 74 experiments with “no”, “low” or “high” ﬁnancial incentives.
They found that the modal result is that there is no eﬀect on mean performance, though
the variance reduces in the presence of higher incentives. Gneezy and Rustichini [18]
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of monetary compensation on performance is not monotonic: in a
treatment where monetary compensation was oﬀered, higher compensation generally led
to higher performance. However oﬀering money does not always produce an improve-
ment: subjects who were oﬀered low monetary rewards produced lower performance than
subjects who were not oﬀered any monetary compensation. Their main ﬁnding is that
performance varies in a non-monotonic way with incentives.
Ariely et al. [4] run experiments where there are diﬀerent types of tasks; some tasks
concentrate on motor skills, some on memory and some on creativity. The highest level
of monetary reward produced a lower performance in all tasks of the ﬁrst experiment; in
the second experiment the task involved only physical eﬀort and they ﬁnd lower perfor-
mance (for higher incentives) in motor skill and creativity, as the psychological literature
predicts.
Finally, incentive eﬀects have also been investigated in the context of positional learn-
ing. Anderson [2] considers a “no payoﬀ” treatment (where participant are paid a ﬁx
amount), “payoﬀ” and “double payoﬀ” treatment where, instead, monetary rewards de-
pend on subjects’ decisions. In this respect, she ﬁnds that rewarding the correct decision
reduces the amount of the decision error, but increasing the payment for a correct decision
does not reduce the error over the range of payoﬀs considered.
3T h e o r y
This Section is divided in two parts. In Section 3.1 we describe and solve the Chi-
nos Game, characterizing the unique guess sequence compatible with a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE hereafter) of the game. The analysis here is made under the behav-
ioral assumption -business as usual in the related literature- that players only aim to
maximize their winning probability. In Section 3.2 we introduce distributional concerns
in a simpliﬁed version of the game, which allows us to convey the main message of our
theoretical conjecture: payoﬀ comparisons across players may yield rational (equilibrium)
shading.
3.1 The Chinos’ Game
In Feri et al.’s [13] experimental Chinos Game, three players, indexed by i ∈ N = {1,..,3}
privately receive a signal si (either 0 or 1) identically and independently drawn from a
ﬁxed probability distribution, with p>1
2 denoting the probability of si =1( p = 3
4 in the
6experiment). Players act in sequence and have to guess the sum of signals, ψ ≡ s1+s2+s3.
By the time Player i makes her guess gi ∈ G ≡ {0,...,3}, she knows her signal (si)a n d
the guesses of those who acted before her in the sequence {g1,...,gi−1}.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
sum of signals for k players follows a Binomial distribution Bin(k,p). Let Mk be the
mode of such a distribution. While in Feri et al.’s [13] all players who guess correctly
(i.e. gi = ψ) receive a ﬁxed prize, our only modiﬁcation of the original protocol consists
in
1. introducing a uniform random draw which selects, at each round, one player in the
sequence (the SP, indexed by k), with
2. the SP, conditional on guessing right, winning the prize with probability αk < 1,
while the other group members’ situation remaining unchanged (i.e. α−k =1 ) .
In each round, both the identity of the SP k, together with her current winning
probability αk are communicated to all group members who may condition their guess
to this information.
Let Hi denote the set of player i0s information sets with generic element h, with
H1 ≡ {h = s1}, H2 ≡ {h =( g1,s 2)} and H3 ≡ {h =( g1,g 2,s 3)}.
Strategies and beliefs are conventionally deﬁned. A behavioral strategy for Player i
is a mapping γi : Hi → G, with γh
i (gi) is the probability of guessing gi at information set
h. By the same token, a system of beliefs is deﬁned as µi = { µh
i ∈ ∆(h)}, with µ ≡ (µi)
If we assume that players aim to maximize their winning probability -as it is common
in the literature on positional learning- given the realized vector of signals s ≡ (s1,s 2,s 3),
there exists a unique equilibrium path, common to all the PBE of the game:
¯ g1(s1)=s1 + M2,
¯ g2(g1,s 2)=( g1 − M2)+s2 + M1, (1)
¯ g3(g2,s 3)=( g2 − M1)+s3.
To see this, remember that, since p is common knowledge, also M1 and M2 are
common knowledge. Thus player 2 and Player 3 can infer s1 from g1 (i.e., s1 = g1 − M2).
By the same token, Player 3 can infer s2 from g2 since g2 − M1 = s1 + s2. Therefore,
in equilibrium, each player perfectly reveals her signal and takes expectations (by way
of Mi) over the sum of signals of her successors in the sequence. This is equivalent to
say that the higher the player position, the higher her chances to win the prize (i.e.
Pr(s2 + s3 = M2)=p2 < Pr(s3 = M1)=p<1). Moreover, by (1), Player 3 needs not
look at Player 1’s guess to evaluate her optimal behavior, since all relevant information
regarding s2 and s1 are contained in g2. Since our experimental conditions imply p = 3
4,
the corresponding PBE path can be derived by substituting M1 =1a n dM2 =2i n
t h ee x p r e s s i o n sa b o v e .N o t i c et h a tt h i sr e s u l ti sn o ta ﬀected by the introduction of our
exogenous random shock.
3.2 Signaling in the Chinos Game
In this Section, we provide some formal dress to our working hypothesis: positional learn-
ing gives rise to rational shading if players have distributional preferences. To show, we
7further simply matters and consider a toy example in which there is uncertainty only on
P l a y e r1 ’ ss i g n a l( i . e .i ti sa si fw ew e r ea s s u ming that Player 2’s probability of winning
only depends on her ability to properly decode Player 1’s guess, g1). In case of a cor-
rect guess, Player 1’s prize is smaller, this indicating the feature of the Chinos game by
which, in equilibrium, Player 1’s probability of winning is smaller than Player 2’s. Figure
3 draws the game-form associated to the strategic situation we just outlined.
Fig. 3. As i m p l i ﬁed version of the Chinos Game of Fig. 1
Let σk
1 = γk
1(1) (σk
2 = γh
2(1)) denote the probability with which Player 1 (2) delivers
the guess g1 =1( g2 =1 ) , after observing Nature’s move s1 = k (Player 1’s guess g1 = k).
Let also µk =P r[ s1 =1|g1 = k] be Player 2’s conditional probability of a positive signal
given g1, evaluated using Bayes’ rule (wherever possible).
Let also πh
j(σ|µ)p l a y e rj’s expected monetary payoﬀ evaluated at h, conditional on
a given behavioral strategy proﬁle σ ≡ (σ1,σ 2), with σi ≡ (σ0
i,σ 1
i), and belief system,
µ. Since player 2 has no chance of aﬀecting Player 1’s probability of winning with her
decision, we shall simply assume that Player 2’s payoﬀ in the game is perfectly aligned
with her expected monetary prize, i.e. uh
2(·)=πh
2(·). By contrast, as for Player 1’s payoﬀ,
we consider the following
Assumption 1
u
h
1(σ)=( 1+θ1)π
h
1(·) − θ1π
h
2(·),θ 1 > −1. (2)
By (2), Player 1’s preferences do not only depend upon her own probability of suc-
cess, but also on the diﬀerence πh
2(σ) − πh
1(σ), where θ1 > 0( θ1 < 0) indicates spiteful
(altruistic) preferences.4 We are interested in characterizing the set of PBE of the game
4Notice that, given distributional concerns, player 1’s payoﬀs also depends upon player 2’s beliefs,
since 1 has to form expectations over 2’s response, since from the latter depends player 2’s expected
monetary payoﬀ which, by (2), aﬀects player 1’s evaluations, too. In this Section, as well as in our
estimation excercise, our manipulation of beliefs as derived by the observation of public guesses avoids
of the complication of modeling higher order beliefs (see the Appendix for the details).
8of Figure 3, as a function of the distributional preference parameter, θ1.5
Proposition 1
1. If θ1 <
p
1−p, the game has a unique (truthfully revealing) separating PBE in which
σ1
1 =1− σ0
1 =1 .
2. If θ1 =
p
1−p, the game has
(a) an hybrid PBE in which σ1
1 =1 ,σ 0
1 <
1−p
p ,,σ 0
2 =0a n dσ1
2 =1 . and
(b) another hybrid PBE in which σ0
1 =0 ,σ1
1 > 2 − 1
p,σ 0
2 =0a n dσ1
2 =1
3. If θ1 >
p
1−p, the game has a pooling PBE in which σ0
1 = σ1
1 =1 ,µ 0 = 1
2 and
σ0
2 ∈
h
θ1(1 − p) − p,
θ1(1−p)
θ1(1−p)+θ1p2
i
.
Proof.
1. Full revelation implies σ2 =( 0 ,1), which in turn implies u1(σ)=( 1+θ1)p − θ1 >
0 ⇐⇒ θ1 >
p
1−p.
2a. σ1
2 = 1 only if µ1 =
pσ1
1
pσ1
1+(1−p)σ0
1 > 1
2, which, in turn, implies σ0
1 <
1−p
p . Since σ1 =
(0,1), µ0 =0 , which, in turn, implies σ0
2 =0 . If σ2 =( 0 ,1), given θ1 =
p
1−p,
u1(σ1,σ 2)=0 , for all σ1.
2b This case is symmetric to 2a. If σ0
1 =0 , then µ1 = 1 (i.e. σ1
2 =1 ) . This, in turn,
implies a lower bound on σ1
1 to make σ0
2 =0 .
3I fσ1 =( 1 ,1), then µ1 = p and µ0 is not deﬁned. This implies that σ1
2 =1 . Since
θ1 >
p
1−p, aP B Ee x i s t si ﬀ µ0 = 1
2 and the following conditions hold:
(1 − σ
0
2)(p − θ1(1 − p)+σ
0
2(p(1 + θ1) < 0;
−θ1σ
0
2 <p − θ1(1 − p).
Proposition 1 depicts diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations, depending on Player 1’s
degree of “spitefulness”, θ1.W h e n θ1 is suﬃciently low (or even negative, indicating
altruism), the unique PBE implies full revelation, in that it maximizes Player 1’s (and
hence, Player 2’s) probability of winning. As θ1 grows, shading becomes prominent,
up to the extreme situation in which 1 always deliver the most likely guess, g1 =1 ,
independently on private information. This is because, in this case, the “equitative
outcome” in which both players fail (i.e. they both get 0) is suﬃciently high in Player
1’s ranking, compared with situations in which 1 gets the prize (but Player 2 gets the
higher prize, too). Finally, notice that, no matter how high is θ1, a PBE in which 1 pools
at g1 = 0 cannot exist. Last, but not least, as usually happens in signaling games, the
5This corresponds to the classic Fehr and Schmidt’s [11] model of social preferences when distribu-
tional concerns are evaluated by as i n g l eparameter.
9game admits pooling equilibria, but not fooling equilibria, in which player 1 consistently
deliver the wrong message. This partially contradicts the evidence of Section 5.
Proposition 1 covers our experimental Chinos Game, once we extend the model to
encompass for 3 players and for a wider variety of guesses. In addition, our utility
speciﬁcation (2) leads naturally to the following:
u
h
1(·)=( 1 + θ
2
1 + θ
3
1)α1π
h
1(·) − θ1α2π
h
2(·) − θ
3
1α3π
h
3(·);θ
k
1 > −1,k=2 ,3; (3)
u
h
2(·)=( 1 + θ
3
2)α2π
h
2(·) − θ
3
2α3π
h
3(·),θ
3
2 > −1; (4)
u
h
3(·)=α3π
h
3(·). (5)
4 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of the experiment in detail.
1. Sessions. The experiment was conducted in 2 sessions at the Laboratory of The-
oretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx) of the Universidad de Alicante. A
total of 48 students (24 per session) was recruited among the undergraduate pop-
ulation of the Universidad de Alicante. The 2 experimental sessions were run in
a computer lab. Instructions were read aloud and we let subjects ask about any
doubt they may have had.6
2. Matching. Subjects played anonymously in groups of 3 players for 24 rounds, always
with the same opponents, always in the same player position (the latter condition
being speciﬁc of our design, compared with related papers, such as Anderson and
Holt [3], or Alsopp and Hey [1]). Both these features were publicly announced and
speciﬁcally designed to ease information decoding, letting subjects to tailor their
subjective beliefs on their speciﬁc player position and on the individual behavior
of their own group members. By this design, we were able to collect 16 indepen-
dent observations of our experimental environment, that is, a comparatively higher
number of observations (8x2=16 for 2 sessions of 24 subjects each), compared with
related experimental works (4 in [1], 12 in [3]).
3. Random events. A te a c hr o u n de a c hp l a y e r ’ ss i g n a lsi was the outcome of an iid
random draw, with p = 3
4. As we already anticipated, the primary modiﬁcation of
Feri et al.’s [13] experimental protocol was to target a player in the sequence with
a negative shock by which, in case of a correct guess, she would enjoy the prize only
with probability αk (instead of 1). Within each round t =1 ,...,24, the identity of
the SP, k, together with the probability of winning the prize if guessing right,α k,
was randomly determined. Let time interval Tτ = {t :3 ( τ − 1) <t≤ 3τ},τ =
1,...,8, be the subsequence of the τ−th 8 rounds. Within each time interval Tτ,
each player was selected once, in a random order, common to all groups. This was
to synchronize the panel. On the other hand, all other random events (i.e. the
realization of αk ∼ U[0,1] and its actual draw, was iid.
6The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [14]). A
copy of the experimental instructions, translated into English, can be found in the Appendix.
104. Payoﬀs. All monetary payoﬀs in the experiment were expressed in Spanish Pesetas
(1 euro is approx. 166 ptas.).7 All subjects received 1000 ptas. (1 euro is approxi-
mately 166 ptas.) just to show up. The ﬁxed prize for each round was equal to 100
ptas. Subjects received, on average, 18 euros for a 45-minute experimental session.
5. Ex-post information. After each round, all subjects were informed on all payoﬀ
relevant information, that is, the correct guess (and, therefore, their individual
payoﬀ) and guesses and signals of all subjects in their group. In addition, the
experimental software provided subjects with an History Table, to better track the
sequence of signals and guesses of all their group members in all previous rounds.
4.1 The Questionnaire
We here brieﬂy summarize the structure of the questionnaire administered to all subjects
at the end of the experiment.8
1. Demographics. The ﬁrst section of the questionnaire collects information about
our subjects’ demographics and academic background. In this section we ﬁnd
questions about age, gender (GEN=1 for female), weekly budget (WB, in euro),
and family’s wealth (RoomSizeRatio, RSR, obtained dividing the family size
with the number of rooms of the main residence).
2. Risk attitudes: Holt and Laury’s [20] test. For all 9 questions, subjects have to
identify their preference between two binary lotteries, one of which (Option 1) is
characterized by a smaller diﬀerence in monetary payoﬀs (i.e. a smaller variance).
The 9 lotteries only diﬀer with respect of the probabilities associated to of the high
prize within each lottery: the higher the probability of the high prize, the higher
the diﬀerence (in favor of the riskier Option 2) in expected payoﬀs. Following Holt
and Laury, we proxy each subject’s attitude to risk by the relative frequency of the
risky option across all 9 questions (i.e. HL∈ [0,1], increasing with risk loving).
3. Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT, Frederick [16]). The CRT is compound of three
simple questions, which are easy in that their solution and easily understood when
explained, but to arrive at the right answer candidates need to suppress the ﬁrst
response that springs ‘impulsively’ to their mind and instead work it out logically.
Thus, beyond the basic mathematical skills necessary to answer the three questions,
the test is meant measure the ability to overcome impulsive answers. It is also a
good indicator of how patient candidates are and how good they are at making
decisions. The test yields an index, CRT∈ [0,1], reporting the relative frequency
of correct answers (i.e. higher CRT indicates higher cognitive reﬂection).
7It is standard practice, for all experiments run in Alicante, to use Spanish ptas. as experimental
currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer problems, compared
with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On the other hand, although Spanish pesetas are
no longer in use (substituted by the Euro in the year 2000), Spanish people still use Pesetas to express
monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a ”real” (as a opposed to an artiﬁcial)
currency, we avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g.
”Experimental Currency”) with no cognitive content.
8A copy of the questionnaire, translated into English, can be found in the Appendix.
115 Results
In presenting our experimental results, Section 5.1 ﬁrst describes our subject pool, us-
ing the information derived from the questionnaire. We then provide some descriptive
statistics in Section 5.2. Since our model is built upon distributional concerns, and
the sequential structure of the game does not admit to aﬀect the predecessors’ winning
probabilities, we shall only report on Player 1 and Player 2’s aggregate and individual be-
havior. We then estimate in Section 5.3 our structural model (3-4), to test our theoretical
conjectures.
5.1 Questionnaire
1. Demographics. The questionnaire was completed by all 48 students participating
to the experiment. They are aged 18 to 26 (mean 20.04, st. dev. 2.28), 31% of them
female. Some two-third of our participants state they are full-time students (i.e.
they do not work, even temporally or part time), and most subjects (just above
90%) report that their parents are the main source of income for their family.
Average number of people living in the household is 4 (sd .96), while their average
weekly budget is 54 euros (sd 72). As for their Academic background, 15% of
subjects comes from Economics, 52% from Business Administration, 7.2% from
other Social Sciences rather than Economics or Business, while 8% follows Science
Degrees.
2. Risk attitudes and personal traits. Table 1 reports the correlation coeﬃcients
between our questionnaire socio-demographics.
GEN RSR WB HL CRT
GEN 1
RSR .14 1
WB -.16 -.13 1
HL -.1 .18 .12 1
CRT -.4∗∗∗ .13 .16 -.05 1
Table 1: Correlations between socio-demographics. Standard errors between brackets. ***=1
%s i g n i ﬁcant; **=5 % signiﬁcant; *=10 % signiﬁcant.
As Table 1 shows, all correlations but one are not statistically signiﬁcant, this indi-
cating that our questionnaire explores complementary dimensions of our subjects’ het-
erogeneity. The only noticeable exception is the (negative) correlation between GEN and
CRT, indicating a signiﬁcantly lower cognitive reﬂection -at least, that proxied by Fred-
erick’s [16] test- on female’s behalf. This is actually in line with the related literature.9
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the relative frequency with which players’ guess coincides with the sum of
signals. Table 2 also reports (within brackets) the corresponding theoretical prediction
9See Frederick [16], p. 37.
12under the assumption that players only aim to maximize their winning probability. Notice
that winning frequencies increase with player position, although at a “slower pace” than
the proﬁt maximizing benchmark.
Player Frequency of guessing right
1 .43 (.56)
2 .55 (.75)
3 .59 (1)
Table 2: Winning distributions
Table 3 summarizes Player 1’s aggregate behavior. In Table 3a) we report behavioral
strategies (i.e. guesses conditional to signals), with regular (bold) type indicating absolute
(relative) frequencies. In Table 3b) relative frequencies are calculated conditional on
Player 1’s guess (instead of Player 1’s signal).
g1 0123
s2 =0 41 9 5 78
% .04 .22 .65 .09
s2 =1 82 6 1 1 0 1 5 2
% .03 .12 .43 .42
g1 0123
s2 =0 4 19 57 8
% .33 .32 .44 .05
s2 =1 8 26 110 152
% .67 .68 .56 .95
a) b)
Table 3: Player 1’s aggregate behavior
From Table 3a) we ﬁrst observe that the proﬁt maximizing guess -see (1)- corresponds
to the modal choice when s1 = 0, but not when s1 = 1 where -basically, Player 1
mixes between g1 =2 and g2 =3 with equal probability. In this respect, average play
conﬁguration is reminiscent -up to some noise- of the hybrid PBE 2b, in that Player 1
mixes conditional on the high signal only. Consistently with 2b, if belief formation did
follow relative frequencies of use -which is our case, see (11) in the Appendix- Player 2,
after observing g1 < 3, should assign to the event s1 = 1 a posterior probability greater
that 1
2. In Table A1 (in the Appendix) we summarize Player 2’s aggregate behavior. Here
again, willingness to reveal greatly diﬀer across information sets, as we observe a rather
diﬀerent behavioral pattern, depending on player 1’s message, g1. When g1 =3 , player
2’s perfectly reveals her signal at least 80% of the times, while, conditional on g1 =2 ,
player 2 mixes with equal probability between g2 =1a n dg2 =2( g2 =2a n dg2 =3 )
depending on whether s2 =0( s2 =1 ) .10
This evidence, obtained aggregating subjects’ behavior observations across matching
groups, hides a high heterogeneity in behavior. This is why, in Table A1 (in the Ap-
pendix) we report Player 1’s behavioral strategies disaggregated across our 16 matching
groups (G1 to G16). As Table A1 shows, the various matching groups display great
heterogeneity in their conformity with maximization of winning probability, with
10Observations for which which g1 < 2 are too few and disperse to draw meaningful conclusions.
13i) full conformity obtained only in 2 cases (G13 and G16);
ii) “almost” full conformity (i.e. less than 10% of deviations) in 2 cases (G2 and
G11);
iii) “moderate” conformity (10% to 30% of deviations) in other 2 cases (G9 and G12);
iv) pooling “2b type” behavior in 3 cases ((G3, G5 and G10);
v) “noisy” behavior (i.e. behavioral patterns which do not follow any of the equilib-
rium proﬁles listed in Proposition 1), for all other cases, up to the extreme case of
G4, which plays a completely mixed behavioral strategu in which about 1
2 of the
times guesses 1 or less.
Player 1 between-subject heterogeneity creates, in turn, great heterogeneity in the
entire development of group behavior (as Figure 2 clearly shows). In the next Section,
we shall apply our model of distributional preferences to check whether deviation from
proﬁt maximizing behavior is consistent with spiteful preferences (and how the latter are
sensitive to subjects’ socio-demographics).
5.3 Estimating spiteful behavior
We are now in the position to estimate, both at the aggregate level and for each experi-
mental matching group, a behavioral model in which at each point in time t =1 ,...,24,
(common) players’ beliefs µh
t are evaluated by (11). Following (3-5), vl
it is the value
associated to option l =0 ,...,4b yp l a y e ri, with
v
l
it = u
h
i (e
l
¯ ¯ ¯µ
h
t )+ε
l
it, (6)
where el =
h
el(j)
i
,w i t hel(j)=0i fj 6= l and el(l)=1 , and εl
it is independently and
normally distributed, with mean 0 and constant variance (to be estimated together with
the other parameters of the model). By (6), subject i guesses l at round t if
l ∈ argmax
hn
v
0
it,...,v
3
it
oi
.
Under our assumptions on stochastic term εl
it, the probability that individual i guesses l
at round t follows a logistic distribution,
Pr(gi = l)=
exp
h
λivl
it
i
3 P
j=0
exp
h
λiv
j
it
i, (7)
where λi measures subject i’s precision in maximizing her objective function.11 We aug-
ment our behavioral model to include a precision parameter to keep track more eﬃciently
the information transmission along the sequence.
According with (7), our estimation strategy consists in a two-step procedure by which:
11See, for example, Stahl and Wilson [24].
141. in the ﬁrst step we estimate subjects’ beliefs µt using (11), while
2. in the second step we estimate -via partial maximum likelihood- the distributional
parameter proﬁle θi and the precision parameters λi which better suits subjects’
behavior.
Table 4 reports the pool estimation of (7). The reported estimated standard errors
in Table 4 take also into account matching group clustering.
Coeff. Std. err. p− value 95% conf. int.
λ1 5.32 .9 0 3.54 7.1
λ2 4.66 .53 9 3.62 5.7
λ3 1.33 .24 0 .84 1.82
θ2
1 .37 .11 .01 .15 .59
θ3
1 .025 .11 .8 -.17 .22
θ3
2 .53 .24 .03 .06 1
Table 4: Pool estimates of ()
As Table 4 shows, the estimates of λi detect a decay in players’ accuracy along the
sequence (where the loss in accuracy is particularly noticeable between Player 2 and
Player 3). Also the estimates of θ
j
i exhibit a decay in distributional concerns: they are all
positive (this indicating the predominance of spiteful motives), but are only signiﬁcant
when they refer to player i’s immediate successor. In Table A3 (in the Appendix) we
report the estimations of the individual λi and θ
j
i f o ra l lo u r1 6m a t c h i n gg r o u p s ,G 1t o
G16. Here we ﬁnd that, at the level of the individual estimation of player 1’s parameters,
our modely nicely adapts to the taxonomy we produced in the previous paragraph (take,
for instance, the extreme cases of G3, G4, G5, G10, G13 and G16).
In Table 5 we control our between-subject heterogeneity by conditioning the pool
estimates of (7) upon treatment conditions (αk)a n do u rq u e s t i o n n a i r ev a r i a b l e s( s e e
Section 4.1).12
In Table 5, our accuracy parameters λi are regressed against socio-demographics and
treatment conditions, as follows:
λi =
X
j≤i
β
j
iαj + βGENGEN + βRSRRSR + βWBWB + βHLHL + βCRTCRT. (8)
In (8), αj, j ≤ i, are used as regressors. As Table 5 shows, we expect (and ﬁnd)
β
j
i > 0. As for βi
i, a positive coeﬃcient indicates that players’ accuracy in optimizing
their objective function grows with the probability of winning the prize in case of a
correct guess (we called it a direct eﬀect of αi on λi).This conjecture is in line with many
models of bounded rationality, such as McKelvey and Palfrey’s [21] QRE), by which the
probability of a suboptimal action is decreasing the expected payoﬀ loss. A positive and
signiﬁcant βi
i is also perfectly compatible with Feri et al’s ([13]) model of error cascades.
12Also in Table 5, the reported estimated standard errors take also into account group clustering.
15λ1 λ2 λ3 θ2
1 θ3
1 θ3
2
α1 8.1 (3.7)** 4.01 (1.16)*** .45 (.44) - - -
α2 - 1.69 (.33)*** .62 (.26)** - - -
α3 - - 1.63 (.62)** - - -
∆α
2
1 - - - .3 (.1)*** - -
∆α
3
1 - - - - .17 (.1)* -
∆α
3
2 - - - - - .4 (.1)***
GEN .1 (2.5) -.6 (1.3) .33 (.69) -.5 (.2)*** -.17 (.1)* -.49 (.3)*
RSR 6.3 (1.3)*** 2.05 (1.8) -.05 (.04) .01 (.19) .11 (.09) .49 (.3)*
WB -.01 (.03) -.014 (.4) .058 (.05) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
HL 5.82 (2.94)** 4.01 (1.1)*** 5.45 (2.9)* -.02 (.33) -.16 (.3) -.44 (.77)
CRT 21 (5.25)*** 12.3 (6)*** 9.48 (3.7)*** -.26 (.32) -.08 (.22) .19 (.22)
Table 5: Estimates of λi and αi conditional on socio-demographics. Standard errors between
brackets. ***=1 % signiﬁcant; **=5 % signiﬁcant; *=10 % signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, we also expect (and ﬁnd) β
j
i>0, with j<i .This is due to the reduced
trust player i holds on j’s message, whenever the latter, given k = j (i.e. j is the SP),
is -correctly, given our estimates- expected to be noisier than usual (we called this an
indirect eﬀect). By analogy with our ﬁndings in Table 4, we see that also this eﬀect is
fading with the distance between player in the sequence (take the case of β1
3, which is
still positive, but not signiﬁcant). As for the eﬀects of socio-demographics, we ﬁnd that
both CRT and (somewhat more surprisingly) HL have a positive impact on subjects’
accuracy.
As for the distributional parameters, θ
j
i,j>i,we opted for the following speciﬁcation:
θ
j
i = γ
j
i∆α
j
i + γGENGEN + γRSRRSR + γWBWB + γHLHL + γCRTCRT, (9)
with ∆α
j
i = αj−αi. In this case, we expect (and ﬁnd) γj > 0, indicating an increasing
spitefulness in the diﬀerence in winning probabilities. Again, also this eﬀect fades with
the distance between players in the sequence. As for socio-demographics, GEN seems to
capture the only signiﬁcant factor, with women, on average, more altruistic than men.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides an alternative -although complementary- explanation to deviation
from proﬁt maximizing behavior in the context of positional learning. According to the
simple model we develop in Section 3.2, subjects may be willing to consciously reduce
their winning probability, if this reduces their comparative disadvantage, in a situation
-such as positional learning- where the latter is not due to others’ behavior, but simply
to the exogenous structure of information transmission (and, in this sense, is not likely to
yield reciprocal behavior). Our experimental evidence shows that our additional explana-
tion seems to work better for some experimental groups than others, for which the “error
cascade” story seems a more plausible justiﬁcation to deviation from proﬁt maximizing
behavior.
16In other words, subjects’ heterogeneity seems one of key issues when reading the data,
even more when we provide a theoretical benchmark which allows for multiple equilibria.
In this respect, we shall remind the reader that, in this paper, heterogeneity is dealt in
two ways:
1. in Table A3 (in the Appendix), we measure our between subjects heterogeneity
by estimating the behavioral parameters of our model (i.e. our between subjects’
heterogeneity) are estimated -as constant, given the relative small number of obser-
vation per subjects (24)- individual by individual, while
2. in Table 5 we condition our (pool) estimates upon the observed heterogeneity mea-
sured by our questionnaire proxies.
Both approaches have limitations in that i) in the individual estimates, we cannot use
(against our own evidence) treatment conditions -such as αk- as explanatory variables in
the regressions, while ii) in our pool estimates (again, contradicted by our own evidence),
we are forced to estimate the behavioral characteristics of a “representative agent”, whose
estimated parameters greatly diﬀer from those of many of our subjects, if not all.
Two recent papers (namely, Harrison and Rutstr¨ om [19] and Conte et al. [10]) try to
solve the above problems by allowing for the possibility that more than one behavioral
model may be used to explain the history of the observed choices generated by the same
subject (or the same subject pool). To this aim, they employ mixture models to estimate
the probability that each of the assumed generating processes applies to the sample,
estimating simultaneously-by maximum likelihood- the behavioral parameters associated
with each model. While Harrison and Rutstr¨ om [19] run pooled regressions, and control
for heterogeneity using questionnaire socio-demographics, Conte et al. [10] consider
both within-subjects and between subject heterogeneity, by estimating the distribution
over the entire population of the relevant parameters of the model. Although we are
working with nested models, as diﬀerent types are simply characterized by diﬀerent
realizations of the same parameter vectors, a mixture analysis may help us to track
better the equilibrium selection problem at the group level (i.e. the convergence of
diﬀerent matching to diﬀerent equilibria of the game).
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19Appendix
7 Feri et al’s [13] “error cascades”
To evaluate proﬁt maximizing behavior, we ﬁrst estimate, at each round t and for each
matching group, behavioral strategies ˆ γh
it =
n
ˆ γh
it(gi)
o
, i =1 ,2,3, as the relative frequency
of use of each possible guess at each information set. For information sets never reached
at t, we posit uniform play, i.e., we assign equal probability to each guess in G. All this
leads to a full-ﬂedged system of behavioral strategies estimated at the beginning of round
t, which are constructed as follows:
ˆ γ
h
jt(gj)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
Pt−1
τ=1 χτ(h∧gj)
Pt−1
τ=1 χτ(h) if
Pt−1
τ=1 χτ(h) > 0
1
4 otherwise,
(10)
where χτ(Ξ) = 1 if the event Ξ occurs in round τ, and 0 otherwise. In words, to estimate
Player j’s behavioral strategy at h,P l a y e ri simply counts the number of times Player j
has guessed gj at h, conditional on h being visited sometime in the past. Otherwise, we
assume that i assigns a uniform probability distribution over j’s behavioral strategies at
h. Once these (assumed common) perceptions on behavioral strategies ˆ γh
it are derived,
we can evaluate the induced conditional probabilities of signals over guesses:
β
(g1)
1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1−p)ˆ γ0
1(g1)
(1−p)ˆ γ0
1(g1)+pˆ γ1
1(g1) if g1 < 3,
pˆ γ1
1(g1)
(1−p)ˆ γ0
1(g1)+pˆ γ1
1(g1) if g1 =3 ;
(11)
β
(g1,g2)
2 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
pˆ γ
(g1,1)
2 (g2)
pˆ γ
(g1,1)
2 (g2)+(1−p)ˆ γ
(g1,0)
2 (g2) if
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
g2 =3o r
g2 =2 ,g1 < 3a n dβ
(g1)
1 >φ (p)o r
g2 =2 ,g1 =3a n dβ
(g1)
1 < 1 − φ(p)
(1−p)ˆ γ
(g1,0)
2 (g2)
pˆ γ
(g1,1)
2 (g2)+(1−p)ˆ γ
(g1,0)
2 (g2) otherwise.
with φ(x)=1−2x
1−3x. As explained in Feri et al. [13], these probabilities are identiﬁed with
the beliefs (as held by other players) that Players 1 and 2 hold the signal that maximizes
the probability of winning the prize, conditional on their guesses. For our purposes, these
beliefs measure the extent of optimality embodied by the estimated strategies of Players
1a n d2 .G i v e nt h eb e l i e f sβ
(g1)
1t and β
(g1,g2)
2t induced by the empirical behavioral strategies
computed in (??), we are in a position to assess whether the behavior of Players 2 and 3
qualiﬁes as optimal, i.e., maximizes expected payoﬀs given those beliefs. For each subject
(in player position) i, we construct an index variable brh
it ∈ {0,1},w h i c hi se q u a lt o1i f
and only if Player i selects the optimal guess at the information set h visited at t.F i g u r e
2 tracks the relative frequency bit =
Pt
τ=1 brh
iτ
t with which, for each experimental group
and up to any round t =1 ,...,20, each Player i =1 ,2,3 submitted her optimal guess
(i.e., had brh
it =1 ) .
208 Additional statistical evidence
g2 0123
s2 =0 0 2 1 0
g1 =0 % 0 .22 .68 0
s2 =1 0 2 6 1
% 0 .22 .68 .1
s2 =0 1 10 2 0
g1 =1 % .08 .77 .15 0
s2 =1 0 4 21 7
% .02 .31 .51 .16
s2 =0 0 19 24 0
g1 =2 % 0 .44 .56 0
s2 =1 0 66 8 5 0
% 0 .05 .55 .4
s2 =0 0 64 01
g1 =3 % 0 .13 .85 .02
s2 =1 0 51 71
% 0 .04 .15 .81
g2 0 123
s2 =0 0 2 1 0
g1 =0 % - .5 .14 0
s2 =1 0 2 6 1
% - .5 .86 1
s2 =0 1 10 2 0
g1 =1 % 1 .71 .09 0
s2 =1 0 4 21 7
% 0 .29 .91 1
s2 =0 0 19 24 0
g1 =2 % - .76 .26 0
s2 =1 0 6 68 50
% - .24 .74 1
s2 =0 0 6 40 1
g1 =3 % - .54 .7 .01
s2 =1 0 5 17 1
% - .45 .3 .99
a) b)
Tab. A1. Player 2’s aggregate behavioral strategies
s1 01
g1 01230123
G1 0 .4 .6 0 .05 .16 .37 .42
G2 0 0 .83 .17 .06 0 0 .94
G3 0 0 1 0 0 .3 .44 .26
G4 0 .29 .43 .28 0 .06 .65 .29
G5 0 .2 .8 0 0 0 .63 .37
G6 .12 .33 .22 .33 .4 .27 .2 .13
G7 0 .67 .33 0 0 .21 .5 .29
G8 .33 .33 .34 0 0 .17 .67 .16
G9 0 .2 .8 0 0 0 .32 .68
G10 0 0 1 0 0 0 .47 .53
G11 0 .12 .88 0 0 0 .06 .94
G12 0 .17 .67 .16 0 .11 .22 .67
G13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
G14 .2 0 .6 .2 0 .11 .53 .36
G15 0 .67 .33 0 0 .14 .76 .1
G16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
TOT .05 .22 .65 .08 .03 .09 .37 .51
Tab. A2. Player 1’s behavioral strategies diaggregated for matching groups
21λ1 λ2 λ3 θ
2
1 θ
3
1 θ
3
2
G1 2.49** 7.5*** -.65 -.9 -.69 -.11
G2 12*** 3.04*** .12 -.001 .12 .82***
G3 3.67** 5.65*** 3.32*** 1.12** .88* .4
G4 3.03* 3.45*** 4.12*** -.16 1.14 .26
G5 9.8*** 3.78*** 4*** .28* .6*** .55**
G6 -.47 1.04 .43 -.59 -1.5 -.8
G7 17*** 6.4*** 1.48*** .92*** .01 -.05
G8 4.7*** 6.72*** .86 .97*** .88* .68***
G9 11*** 7.9*** .97** .44** -.33 .31*
G10 10.6*** 5.01*** .18 .36 .19 -.11
G11 18*** 7.76*** 1.04** -.09 -.15 -.23
G12 5.2*** 4.5*** 1.6*** .24 -.05 .05
G13 ∞ 6.6*** 2.05 - - -.02
G14 3.7 3.14*** .84 .26 .22 .35*
G15 5.1*** 2.67*** 2.31*** .81*** -.32 .74***
G16 ∞ 7.21*** 2.41*** - - -.3
TOT 5.32*** 4.37*** 1.3*** .37*** -.02 .34**
Tab. A3. Structural estimation of (7) by cluster
229 The Experimental instructions
9.1 Welcome to the experiment
This is an experiment to study how people solve decision problems. Our unique goal is
to see how people act on average; not what you in particular are doing. That is, we do
not expect any particular behavior of you. However, you should take into account that
your behavior will aﬀect the amount of money you will earn throughout the experiment.
These instructions explain the way the experiment works and the way you should use your
computer. Please do not disturb the other participants during the course experiment.
If you need any help, please, raise your hand and wait quietly. You will be attended as
soon as possible.
9.2 The game
This experimental session consists of 20 rounds in which you and two additional persons
in this room will be assigned to a group, that is to say, including you there will be a
total of three people in the group. You, and each of the other two people, will be asked
to make a choice. Your choice (and the choices of the other two people in your group)
will determine the amount of money that you will earn after each round. Your group
will remain the same during the whole experiment. Therefore, you will be always playing
with the same people. During the experiment, your earnings will be accounted in pesetas.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid the corresponding amount of Euros that
you have accumulated during the experiment.
The game. Notice that you have been assigned a player number.Y o u rp l a y e rn u m b e r
is displayed at the right of your screen. This number represents your player position in
a sequence of 3 (Player 1 moves ﬁrst, Player 2 moves after Player 1 and Player 3 moves
after Players 1 and 2). Your position in the sequence will remain the same during the
entire experiment. At the beginning of each round, the computer will assign to each
person in your group (including yourself) either 0 tokens or 1 token. Within each group,
each player is assigned 0 tokens with a probability of 25% and is assigned 1 token with a
probability of 75%. The fact that a player is assigned 0 tokens or 1 token is independent
of what other players are assigned; that is to say, the above probabilities are applied
separately for each player.
At each round, the computer executes again the process of assignment of tokens to
each player as speciﬁed above. The number of tokens that each player is assigned at
any particular round does not depend at all on the assignments that he/she had in other
rounds. You will only know the number of tokens that you have been assigned (0 or 1),
and you will not know the number of tokens assigned to the other persons in your group.
T h es a m er u l ea p p l i e sf o rt h eo t h e rg r o u pm e m b e r s( e a c ho ft h e mw i l lo n l yk n o wh i s / h e r
number of tokens).
At each round you will be asked to make a guess over the total number of tokens
distributed among the tree persons in your group (including yourself) at the current
round. The other members of your group will also be asked to make the same guess. The
order of the guesses corresponds to the sequence of the players in the group. That is to
say: Player 1 makes his/her guess ﬁrst, then Player 2 makes his/her guess and, ﬁnally,
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of the players in your group that moved before yourself. Therefore, Player 2 will know
Player 1’s guess and Player 3 will know both Player 1 and Player 2’s guesses.
At each round, if you make the correct guess you will win a prize of 100 pesetas and
if your guess is not the correct one you will earn nothing.
9.3 The SELECTED PLAYER (el JUGADOR ELEGIDO)
In each round, the computer will select one player in your group at random. We shall
call her the SELECTED PLAYER. Her identity will vary from one round to the next,
so that, you and the other group members will be selected the same number of time,
approximately.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE SELECTED?
While those players who have not been elected, in case of guessing right, win the
prize with certainty, the SELECTED PLAYER win the prize with a certain probability,
randomly selected by the computer. This probability, together with the identity of the
SELECTED PLAYER, will be communicated to all group members at the beginning of
each round.
10 The Questionnaire
As we just anticipated, our questionnaire is divided into four diﬀerent groups of questions.
10.1 Demographics
1. What is your age?.....years.
2. What is your gender?
3. Which is your university degree?.....
4. How many years have you been studying at the university?
5. What is your relationship with the main source of income in your family?
6. What is the labor position of the person who contributes the main source of income
in your family?
7. What was the highest level of education that the main source of income in your
family completed?
8. How many people live in your household?
9. How many rooms does the house have you are living in?
10. Did you work during the last week?
11. On average, what is your weekly budget?.....euros
12. What is your health?
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1. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 1 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 9 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 1 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 9 in 10.
2. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 2 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 8 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 2 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 8 in 10.
3. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 3 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 7 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 3 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 7 in 10.
4. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 4 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 6 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 4 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 6 in 10.
5. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 5 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 5 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 5 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 5 in 10.
6. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 6 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 4 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 6 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 4 in 10.
7. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
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of 3 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with a probability of 7 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 3 in 10.
8. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 8 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 2 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 8 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 2 in 10.
9. Which of these two lotteries do you prefer?
(a) Winning 2.00$ with probability of 9 in 10 and winning 1.60$ with probability
of 1 in 10.
(b) Winning 3.85$ with probability of 9 in 10 and winning 0.10$ with probability
of 1 in 10.
10.3 Frederick’s [16] Cognitive Reﬂection Test
1. A bat and a ball cost C = 1.10 in total. The bat costs C = 1.00 more than the ball.
How many cents does the ball costs?.....cents. (Answer: 5).
2. If it takes 5 machines, 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, How many minutes would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?.....minutes. (Answer: 5).
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch double in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake.....days. (Answer: 47).
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